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The dominant manners in which environmental issues have been framed by sociology
are deeply problematic. Environmental sociology is still firmly rooted in the Cartesian
separation of Society and Nature. This separation is one of the epistemic foundations
of Western modernity—one which is inextricably linked to its capitalist, colonial, and
patriarchal dimensions. This societal model reifies both humanity and nature as entities
that exist in an undeniably anthropocentric cosmos in which the former is the only
true actor. Anthropos makes himself and the world around him. He conquers, masters,
and appropriates the non-human, turning it into the mere environment of his existence,
there solely for his use. If sociology remains trapped in this paradigm it continues to
be blind to the multiple space-time specific interrelations of life-elements through which
heterogeneous and contingent ontologies of humans and extra-humans are enacted.
If these processes of interconnection are not given due attention, the socioecological
worlds in which we—human as well as others—live cannot be adequately understood.
But misunderstandings are not the only issue at stake. When dealing with life-or-death
phenomena such as climate change, to remain trapped inside the Society/Nature
divide is to be fundamentally unable to contribute to world reenactments that do
not oppress—or, potentially, extinguish—life, both human and extra-human. From the
inside of Anthropos’ relation to his environment the only way of conceiving current
socioecological problems is by framing them in terms of an environmental crisis which
could, hypothetically, be solved by the very same societal model that created it. But if the
transformation of some of the world(s)’ life-elements into the environment of the Human
is part of the problem, then, socioecological issues cannot be adequately understood or
addressed if they are framed as an environmental crisis. Instead, these problems need
to be conceived as a crisis of Western modernity itself and of the kind of worlds that are
possible and impossible to build within it.
Keywords: capitalism, environment, environmental crisis, nature, social sciences, society, sociology, western
modernity
INTRODUCTION
Sociology studies interaction—specifically, it studies interactional distributions and enactments of
power-knowledge and ontologies. That much still remains true. But there have been considerable
changes—bothwithin and outside the social sciences—since the times ofMarx,Weber, Simmel, and
other classical sociologists. The field’s opening to the study of environmental issues has shattered
many of what have historically been its epistemological and ontological foundations. As is the case
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of all of the social sciences and humanities, “thinking through
the environment” deeply “unsettles” many of sociology’s
core assumptions1,2.
In order to be able to adequately understand “environmental
issues”—and among them the very much urgent issue of climate
change—sociology needs to move beyond the analytical exclusive
focus on human interaction(s). There have been several proposals
in this direction, but they still remain less than mainstream
research stances (although it is arguable that this is less the case
now than it was some decades ago). It is not possible to remain
trapped inside the confines of what humans do with each other
and expect to understand the myriad interrelations of human
and extra-human life-elements3 of the world(s). To remain
enclosed by an a priori defined privilege of human interaction
is to stay incapable of seeing the true extent of the networks
of life-elements that compose the socioecological phenomena
that sociology studies. This does not mean that sociologists must
become experts of all things, which would undoubtedly lead them
to become experts of nothing. But there is a need to significantly
widen the scope of the interrelations that we study. Humanity still
has an important place in research, but the analytical focus must
move from the intra-human to “the web of life,” to adopt Moore’s
(2016a,b) concept.
To be precise, the problem at hand is the Western modern
paradigm of knowledge and practice in which sociology moves
itself (i.e., the paradigm for whose constitution and maintenance
it contributes). Among other things, this paradigm is patriarchal,
colonial, capitalist, and anthropocentric. It institutionalizes
forms of existence that enact specific types of human-nature
relations where the second term is subordinated to the first
(Santos, 1991, p. 14 et seq.; Santos, 2006, p. 91 et seq., p. 169 et seq;
Plumwood, 1993; Lander, 2009; Latour, 2010; Moore, 2016a,b).
Given this, what is needed is not a calibration of research
elements similar to the one that was done from the 1960s onward
when, to accompany formal political decolonization happening
in the Global South, sociology started opening its doors to the
study of human worlds outside of the West (obviously, there
where sociologists preoccupied with extra-Western phenomena
before this date, but they were far from being the majority). To
replicate this now is unsustainable because we are not dealing
with more human elements to add to the mix. For some decades
now, we have been facing an irruption of the extra-human into
what has historically been a human-focused field of inquiry. It
is not further human populations that are entering our field of
vision but trees, and animals, and water, and gases, and rocks.
1We are borrowing the formulation of Rose et al. (2010): “Thinking through the
environment, unsettling the Humanities.”
2This article’s arguments focus on the case of environmental sociology. The fact
that we are both sociologists is not irrelevant to this choice as it makes sociology
the discipline whose limits and potentialities we know best. Nevertheless, the issues
discussed are of broader paradigmatic consequence to the (heterogeneous) whole
ofWestern modernity. As such, we are inclined to believe that many of what is said
might be pertinent to discussions held in other fields of knowledge that still regard
themselves as studying “environmental” phenomena.
3We use the term “life-elements” to refer to all entities of the world(s) that, in one
way or another, contribute to the collective enactment(s) of life. These are both
biologically living elements and all the other things of the world(s) that, together
with the former, make up what Moore (2016a,b) calls the “web of life.”
As such, any attempt to merely add up a new element—the
environment, nature, or whatever one chooses to call it—to our
considerations simply does not work4.
If epistemological and ontological changes stop there, as they
are prone to do, sociology is not doing anything very original.
It is merely replicating the same Cartesian divide of Society
vs. Nature that has, since its beginning, characterized it. For
200 years, sociologists have mainly dealt with this divide by
focusing on just one of its poles—the better one, the most
interesting one; or so we thought. To add the environment to
our conceptualization of the world still leaves us trapped in a
conceptualization of an anthropocentric world. We still focus
on Society. We just start taking into account the ways in which
human action conditions Nature.
“Thinking through the environment” (Rose et al., 2010)
should be unsettling for sociology. It should lead us not to
rethink but rather to fundamentally unthink (Wallerstein, 2001)
what sociology has taken for granted for far too long. This
exercise of unthinking Western modernity and its foundational
epistemological and ontological assumptions leads to the
radically relationist study of the multiple and heterogeneous
interconnections between different life-elements of the world(s),
neither of them a priori classifiable as belonging to “humanity” or
“nature” but rather thus constituted through and along the very
process of interrelation. As such, adding up Nature to Society
(or Humanity, or Culture, or any equivalent) does not do. This
position validates the reification of both terms and keeps them, as
they have been for 500 years in slightly different ways, in relation
to each other (Moore, 2016a,b). And, given human privilege
vis-à-vis the non-human, Society’s relation to Nature wrongly
distributes agency, viewing it solely as a human capacity, thus
turning nature into mere passivity. Even narratives on the Earth’s
revenge on humanity reinforce this insofar as in them nature’s
action is mostly re-action to the effects of what humanity—the
only true actor in this story—does.
Unthinking what we know—including what we know about
how we know—implies refusing to understand this issue in terms
of humanity’s relation to nature but rather conceptualizing it
in terms of the space-time specific interrelations of different
elements of the web of life. These are not in relation to each
other, and much less are they in a binary relation in which one
of the parts acts upon the other, the former’s actions generating
a set of consequences on the latter. These multiple life-elements
enter into multiple space-time localized relationswith each other,
collectively establishing contingent, dynamic, and conflictual
arrangements of human and extra-human beings and things—
in Haraway’s (2016, p. 34 et passim) formulation, composing
“multispecies muddles.” In other words, through their collective
practices they compose collectives; they collectively enact worlds.
4See Moore (2016a,b) for a critique of this “green arithmetic,” “the idea that our
histories may be considered and narrated by adding up Humanity (or Society)
and Nature, or even Capitalism plus Nature. (. . . ) [S]uch dualisms are part of the
problem—they are fundamental to the thinking that as brought the biosphere to its
present transition toward a less habitable world. (. . . ) [T]he categories of “Society”
and “Nature”—Society without nature, Nature without humans—are part of the
problem, intellectually and politically” (Moore, 2016a, p. 2).
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In this essay we propose to unthink some of sociology’s
foundations of knowledge and practice. We do this by
focusing on the Western modern dominant concept of nature,
and particularly by discussing its transformation into the
environment. The first section starts by looking at the
Cartesian conception of the world in terms of Society/Nature,
which necessarily subordinates the life-elements placed in the
second term to those placed in the first. We then locate
the Society/Nature divide within the wider Western modern
dualistic logic, which is inherently totalizing and hierarchical.
With this background, we argue that current mainstream
sociological approaches to the study of human-nature relations
have not sufficiently broke with its paradigmaticWesternmodern
origins, making them unable to understand the multiplicity of
interrelations between life-elements by which socioecological
phenomena are enacted. The following section starts by looking
at how nature is turned into the environment ofWestern modern
humanity, which is an essential process for the latter’s dominant
approach to the government of human life. We then discuss how
this is inextricable from capitalism insofar as it allows nature to be
enacted as a series of commodities. Following this we argue that
if the concept of the environment is inherently problematic, then
environmental sociology has a foundational problem that it may
be unable of solving. The section ends by contending that, due
to these conceptual and practical problems, the environmental
crisis is the wrong framing for the current Western modern crisis
of enactment of socioecological ontologies and worlds.
There are far more sociological concepts and practices in need
of unthinking. And much more could be said about nature and
(its conversion into) the environment. Our position in this essay
is quite humble and has no pretension to exhaustively discuss all
that need to be unthought. We are merely pointing to some of the
perplexities that have been bothering us in our common research,
thus adding to the collective effort(s) of unthinking Western
modern enactments of life with the hope that others will find this
exercise relatable to their own intellectual and political concerns.
QUESTIONING NATURE
The last 50 years have seen the emergence of many significant
contributions to the exercise of unthinking Western modern
enactments of the world(s) that inspires this essay: from the
historical-philosophical tours de force of Foucault (1994, 2005a,b,
2012a), Kuhn (2009), or Feyerabend (1993), to science and
technology studies (STS) and actor-network theory (ANT),
passing through several schools of feminist and decolonial
thought5. All of these have been listened to and developed by
many other researchers, and we build our own work from and
alongside them. Nonetheless, the critical exercise of unthinking
5There are too many references to quote for any of these (internally very much
heterogeneous) lines of work. We merely highlight some of those we consider to
be especially relevant for this exercise of unthinking. For STS and ANT, see Callon
(1986), Latour (2007, 2010), Latour and Callon (1981), Law (2002, 2004), and Mol
(2002). Haraway (1991) and Plumwood (1993) present two feminist positions that
are particularly relevant for issues discussed in this essay. For the case of decolonial
thought, see Dussel (1995); Mignolo (1995, 2000); Lander (2005), Said (2003), and
Quijano (2007).
and re-enacting is still far from being the norm for research
carried out within sociology. This is undoubtedly the case of
research on matters of human-nature relations.
Most sociological research on the general field of the relation
of humanity to the rest of the cosmos has a firm footing
on the Cartesian division of Nature and Society (or Culture,
or any equivalent) (Descartes, 1982). As is the case of other
fields on inquiry, research on “the environment” develops both
through stances that are (to various degrees) critical of certain
arrangements of practices characteristic of Western capitalist
modernity and through positions which present—and, many
times, believe—themselves as defending the axiological neutrality
of science. Both of them are very much heterogeneous and this
analytical partition is merely a shorthand. But most of these
stances tend to implicitly validate and solidify the Social Contract
argument of Hobbes (2002), Rousseau (2003), or Locke (2001),
according to which the creation of any sort of civil and political—
in essence, social—state is inherently dependent on the exit from
the state of nature6. In this fashion, the sum of human beings,
all of them exemplars of ego cogito, is withdrawn from the rest
of the cosmos. All that is not humanity is thus transferred to one
or more of the following categories: chaos, vital threat, landscape,
romantic ideal, and/or resource reservoir.
No matter what category each of the constitutive parts of
the non-human is put in—and the exact distribution varies
dynamically according to space and time—it is thought of as
being in relation to humanity. However, by definition, it is
not part of humanity. Human and non-human (natural), their
ontologies are different, even if the existence of each of them
is ontologically dependent on the existence of the other. Ego
cogito does not change his or her essence because of the action
of the elements of the non-human7. He is in himself and from
himself. In the same manner, nature’s essence is unchangeable.
The modern project of dominion of nature (Plumwood, 1993;
Scott, 1998; Serres, 1998; Latour, 2010; Debaise et al., 2015)
operates around the idea of taming nature, of molding it to
humanity’s wishes (or rather to the wishes of some members
of humanity). In this fashion, Western modern human action
is able to reshape nature’s appearance, to cut down trees, to
relocate animals and plants, to make water change its course, to
hollow out nature by extracting what lies within it, to disrupt
its homeostatic equilibriums. But this does not change nature’s
essence as Nature opposed to Human, as Nature in so far as
it is non-Human. Nature’s role as the Great Outside of the
Human is not up for questioning. Paradoxically, it is assumed
to remain (ontologically) the same even as it is made to change
(geologically, geographically, biologically, etc.) by human action.
It remains reality out-there, existing independently of how it
is perceived, prior to statements made about it, in a definite
and singular form (Law, 2004, p. 23 et seq.). It can be seen,
6Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke had fundamental divergences on several topics,
which cannot be discussed here. Nonetheless, they shared the general argument
mentioned.
7He might modify his lifestyle as a response to altered environmental conditions,
but this is another matter altogether.
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interpreted, measured, classified, used, etc., precisely because of
its ontological stability.
The Society/Nature divide is a fundamental foundation
of Western modern thought patterns, which are inherently
dualistic (Santos, 1991, p. 14 et seq.; Santos, 2006, p. 91
et seq.; Plumwood, 1993; Said, 2003; Castro-Gómez, 2005;
Lander, 2009)8,9. There are many dichotomies that play a
relevant role in Western modernity—Mind/Body, Self/Other,
White/Non-white, Metropole/Colony, West/East, and so forth.
But Society/Nature, alongside Subject/Object and Male/Female,
are the fundamental modern dichotomies in reference to which
all others work (Plumwood, 1993, p. 41 et seq.). Importantly,
modern dichotomies are expressions of hierarchical relations,
one of the terms being privileged and the other subaltern. As
Plumwood (1993, p. 41 et seq.) argues, this hierarchical logic is
where the command role played by the former three dichotomies
becomes clear: the privileged term of every other dichotomy—
Mind, Self, White, Metropole, West, etc.—tends to be seen
as having characteristics associated with Masculinity, Society,
and the active and rational Subject, whereas the subordinate
term—Body, Other, Non-white, Colony, East, etc.—tends to be
associated with Femininity, Nature, and the irrational (in the
sense of being incapable of rational thought) and passive Object.
This hierarchical logic is clear in the dominant
conceptualization of Society/Nature. The mythologem that
is the state of nature is what one leaves in order to collectively
create a social existence, the only one that truly matters, the
one that, although imperfect, is far better that the alternative
of nature—with its chaos, dirtiness, discomfort, aggression,
etc. And we must keep in mind that, within this paradigm,
nature is in fact the only alternative to society. It is the sole
alternative because dichotomies are exercises in totality-as-way-
of-ordering-reality, i.e., they are representations of a universe in
which nothing can exist outside either one or the other of the
two entities in relation, thus conceptually eliminating even the
8One should bear in mind that the idea that there is a difference between mind and
body, as well as between humanity and nature, is not an idiosyncrasy of Western
capitalist modernity (Plumwood, 1993, pp. 69–103 et passim). However, as Moore
puts it, “capitalism was the first civilization to organize itself on this basis” (Moore,
2016b, p. 84).
9Law and Lien (2012a) remind us that nature and society (or culture) are
paradoxically both coherent and non-coherent in Western modernity. On the one
hand, there is an undeniable will to make them singular—only one Nature and one
Society, which are the same everywhere. On the other hand, since both nature and
society are enacted by the practices of actor-networks that are bound to particular
places and temporalities, each local network enacts—slightly or pronouncedly—
different ontologies of nature and society, and therefore different forms of their
relationship. But even if no two enactments of Society/Nature are the same, at
any given space-time, the Western modern dualism of Society/Nature that is being
enacted tends to be (re)presented as singular (i.e., as the form of Society/Nature).
And, since these different enactments coordinate themselves in various ways, they
converge (dynamically and contingently) to form one ontology of Society and
one ontology of Nature—that is always dependent on their multiplicity. In this
manner, much like Bauman (1989, 1991) has shown,Westernmodernity’s inherent
ambivalence emerges as its defining characteristic, making ontological multiplicity
not that which negates ontological unity but rather that upon which this unity is
made (Law, 2002, 2004; Mol, 2002; Law and Lien, 2012a,b). We will return to this
in the conclusion of this essay.
imagination, not to mention the praxis, of an existence unrelated
to this logic (Plumwood, 1993; Santos, 2006, p. 91 et seq.).
Most sociological research on issues of the environment
implicitly solidifies this philosophical stance. Uncritically taking
for granted that there is something fundamentally different (i.e.,
better) in humanity (or society, or culture, or whatever else
one chooses to call it), this heterogeneous field of inquiry tends
to practice a “sociology of the social” (Latour, 2007) which,
paradoxically, is extended from the social to its outside—without
ever truly rearticulating the terms of their relationship. For
Latour (2007, p. 160 et passim), a sociology of the social is
doomed to be unsuccessful in its enterprise of understanding
the uncertainty and dynamism of human life because it tries
to explain the social by the social instead of focusing of the
myriad processes of association of human and extra-human life-
elements by which both “the social” and other realms of thought
and practice are enacted. The practice of a sociology of the
social to study issues considered to be outside the social creates
an epistemic conflict: not only should the social be explained
by the social but nature, for centuries understood in Western
modern thought as explaining itself as much as society does
(as long as science was able to progressively determine its/their
laws of operation), now also is (at least in part) explainable by
the social10. The passivity of nature characteristic of Western
modern philosophy, opposed to the reflexive action of humans, is
thus reinforced—even in narratives about the Earth’s revenge on
humanity because of the damage the latter inflicts upon it nature’s
action is re-action, making humanity into the true actor of the
story insofar as without it no movement would have been made
by the other term of the dichotomy.
A sociology of the social can do nothing but fail when trying to
understand the heterogeneous interrelations of human and extra-
human life-elements. It fails by design—albeit not reflexively
so—because such a sociology is firmly grounded on the
Society/Nature divide and, from this standpoint, multiplicity is
not visible. If it cannot be seen, the myriad connections between
different life-elements cannot be made into this sociology’s
central research topic. As such, the worldly relations explored
by this field must be reduced to those that are understandable
in terms of Society/Nature. In this manner, as a starting point,
the world’s life-elements are distributed into the categories of this
dichotomy. When research starts, this has already been done,
which leads to the placement of the elements of the two categories
in relation to each other—fundamentally distinct, one of them
acting over the other. If they are in relation to each other, they
cannot be in relation with each other. This would presuppose
that there are more than two elements in relation, it would
10Nature is now at least in part but not entirely explained by the social. The
extension of a sociology of the social to the study of phenomena historically
considered to be outside of society presupposes that natural phenomena are
conditioned by human action. As such, what happens in society changes nature—
geographically, geologically, biologically, even if not ontologically—, making
nature only understandable if society is taken into account. But this logic does
not negate scientific specialization, i.e., it does not deny that there are natural
phenomena that can only be understood by the natural sciences—even if even the
latter have increasingly started to take into account a (mostly homogenized and
abstract) role played by Humanity in the shaping of the phenomena they study.
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presuppose that worlds are not yet taxonomically distributed
into categories, leaving their life-elements relatively free to roam
and communicate with one another with disregard for analytical
borders. It would assume that these worlds are not only where
these life-elements act and exist but also that they are the
contingent and dynamic result of this very action and existence—
a form of existence-as-action which can only be carried out by
the efforts, work, and energy of space-time localized humans
and extra-humans.
This leaves a sociology of the social with only one way
of conceiving human-natural relations. If life-elements do
not interact in ways that enact worlds—which, among other
things, perform-contain contingent stabilizations of nature and
society—, then, it is from within each of the two realms of Society
and Nature that all things must emerge, eventually overflowing
from one to the other. In other words, a sociology of the
social can only conceive a world in which phenomena specific
to one of these realms condition existence in the other. This
is a cause and effect model of limited interrelation in which,
generally, human action—the action of the Human—develops
through human-specific processes that occur in the environment
of Nature. There is no significant interplay in the generative
process by which these phenomena start; they occur because
humans do things with one another. But what they do together
has such a magnitude that converts them into causes of—mainly
damaging—natural processes (e.g., deforestation, emissions of
greenhouse gases). Human actions emerge as causes of these
phenomena, leading to a set of consequences which occur in the
realm of Nature, depleting and degrading it. This can, eventually,
come back to haunt us; but we alone caused it and the second
level consequences—from human to nature back to human—by
which natural phenomena with human causes damage Society
do not make Nature into a true actor in this story. Granted, this
cause and effect mode of thinking can be made into something
complex, attuned to the idea that different human processes can
combine themselves to cause one outcome and that the same
human phenomenon can contribute to several environmental
consequences. But this only works if the Society/Nature divide
is accepted and validated. And even then this limited conception
of action and interaction is inherently incapable of seeing much
of the actions and interactions by which the worlds in which
we—humans as well as others—live are collectively enacted.
Only by rejecting this dichotomy as something that
exists a priori, as something that predates action(s), and by
understanding it as the contingent and dynamic result of
(both human and extra-human) action(s), can multiplicity be
taken into account. The multiplicity of heterogeneous relations
between different life-elements—human, animal, plant, or
mineral—is what enables each and all of them to act and to enact
different arrangements [or, in Moore’s (2016b) term, “bundles”]
of human and extra-human (Callon, 1986; Law, 2002, 2004; Mol,
2002; Latour, 2007, 2010; Haraway, 2016; Moore, 2016b). And
the life-elements that are distributed into nature or society—
which are not predetermined once and for all but rather are
the object of historical and spatial conflicts, as black slaves and
most women could attest—act in ways that make inappropriate
the cause and effect thought models of sociology of the social’s
study of the environment. When different life-elements come
together to act—both in peaceful and (mostly) in conflictual
ways—, they are not a priori “nature” or “humanity” but are thus
made through and along their collective actions. And the actions
of different networks of human and extra-human life-elements
constantly overflow each of the networks that originally performs
them to reach other such networks, creating multiple flows of
mutual communication between what is, at a certain time and in
a certain place, constructed as social and natural.
Given these shortcomings, a sociology of the social provides
an inadequate framing for the understanding of the myriad
relations between humanity and nature. No matter how critical
it may be, research developed within this paradigm falls back
into a form of Western modern reification of both Society
(or Humanity, etc.) and Nature. In other words, it starts from
an implicit decision to distribute the world’s life-elements into
these two—and only these two—categories and then proceeds
to ascribe them two ontologically incommensurable essences. It
is only if this conception and practice of sociology is rejected
that it is possible to comprehend the myriad interrelations
between (human and extra-human) life-elements. In order to
move beyond this paradigm, after having started to explore the
conversion of the extra-human into Nature, we now continue
the discussion by looking at the enactment of Nature as
the environment.
NATURE BECOMES THE ENVIRONMENT
OF THE HUMAN
Perhaps the main shortcoming of the extension of a sociology of
the social to the study of the relations between human and extra-
human is immediately visible in the expression “environmental
sociology.”What does this sociology deal with? The environment
of something that does not belong to it. It deals with reified
nature, understood as the outside that is all around equally reified
humanity11. As Serres puts it, “the word environment, commonly
used in this context (. . . ) [,] assumes that we humans are at the
center of a system of nature” (Serres, 1998, p. 33).
Such a sociology most definitely does not study the dynamic
and heterogeneous interrelations between different things of and
in the world, it does not highlight how these temporally and
11Although we are discussing the specific case of environmental sociology, other
environmental social sciences deal with the non-human in a generally similar
fashion: they accept and solidify the fracture between Society and Nature, they
grant a privilege to the Human, and they contribute to the transformation
of nature into mere surrounding of ego cogito. Different social sciences have
historically approached the environment in different ways. But, insofar as their
practitioners regard what they study as the “environment,” these social sciences
also share an epistemic positioning. A specific social science, sociology included,
can have practitioners focused on understanding the socioecological enactment
of worlds, as well as practitioners who study the human (or social, etc.)
dimensions of “environmental” phenomena. The latter work in the same episteme
as environmental sociologists, even if the former might not. Since this is a Western
modern conception, in general terms, the natural sciences subscribe to the same
conception of nature-as-the-environment-of-the-Human, albeit their focus is on
the other side of the divide (with some researchers trying to bridge it without
unmaking it, much like what happens in the social sciences).
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spatially specific interconnections between human and extra-
human life-elements are precisely the processes by which worlds
and those who live in them are collectively enacted. In short,
it does not address the various forms of creating certain space-
time specific arrangements of life, i.e., of creating contingent and
precarious realities and of distributing their component elements
in them by processes of categorization as human and other-
than-human (Law, 2004; Latour, 2007, 2010; Debaise et al., 2015;
Haraway, 2016; Moore, 2016b).
Instead, sociology starts from the positive exception of
the Human. In Western modernity, given the hierarchical
relation of the terms of the duality that is Society/Nature, the
Human is not only outside of the non-human; it is above
it. It is epistemologically, ontologically, and morally superior
to Nature12. Nature appears in relation to—and never with—
humanity, merely as the milieu of its life chances, as the resource
reservoir from which humanity derives “natural resources” and,
depending on space and time, as locus and arche of potential
threats to its life.
As Foucault made clear, the emergence of a biopolitical
rationality of government13 in eighteenth century Europe
elevated the concept-praxis of (human) population to the role
of central subject-object of intervention (Foucault, 1980, 1994,
2006, 2009, 2010). Around this period, the exercise of power
took as its main preoccupation the protection of the human life
of the collective that is population, aiming to increase its life
opportunities by guaranteeing that its behavior did not deviate
from statistical-scientific normality in ways that endangered it.
The consolidation of industrial capitalism, the maintenance of
colonial residents and administrations, and military strength-
in-numbers within (as well as outside) Europe, all required
large quantities of relatively healthy human beings. In order
to meet this requirement of protection of human life (at
least of that human life which power-knowledge conflicts lead
to be placed into categories of the Human), governmental
interventions became more effective by indirectly guiding these
human collectives instead of directly prescribing and adjusting
their conducts. As such, governmental exercises assumed the
form of interventions on the milieu, the environment in which
populations lived, aiming to change the manner in which
collective phenomena were shaped by changing the conditions
which framed the possibilities for each unit of the population
to act (Foucault, 2009, p. 29 et seq.). The underlying logic is
simple to explain, even if the processes by which it is enacted
are very much complex. Want to decrease mortality rates and
increase the general health of the inhabitants of a certain city?
Don’t prohibit individual behaviors that make people sick, like
unsanitary eating or hygienic habits. Don’t threaten individuals
with the strong arm of the law in order to stop them from doing
what has been scientifically discovered to be harmful for them.
12The Human is morally superior to Nature insofar as ethics is defined solely as an
affair of humanity. Nature is not less moral, it is not immoral, it simply is—and in
that pure existence, it is amoral in reference to the Human who thus becomes the
only potentially moral entity.
13“Government” is understood by Foucault (1983, 2009, 2010, 2012b) as the
“conduction of conducts,” which always occurs within the framework of a given
governmentality, i.e., a certain “art of government” or “rationality of government.”
Instead, construct andmaintain centrally regulated urban sewage
systems, create a process of regular garbage collection, or lower
taxes on food rich in protein and vitamins.
Granted, Foucault’s focus is not on the environment
understood as Nature—even if the phenomena which affect a
human population’s life are both “natural” and “social”: laws,
commerce, traditions, or taxation, as well as food, climate,
or disease (Foucault, 2009). Furthermore, his periodization of
Western modern intervention on the environment in order to
govern life is off by some 200 years (McBrien, 2016; Moore,
2016b; Parenti, 2016). But his insight on the central role played by
the environment of humanity in Western modern governmental
exercises must not be downplayed14. If one dates the start of
Western modernity to the transatlantic colonial arrival of 1492
(Wallerstein, 1993, 2004; Dussel, 1995; Mignolo, 1995, 2000;
Lander, 2005; Quijano, 2007; McBrien, 2016; Moore, 2016b), it
becomes clear that humanity (at least that part of humanity which
arrived on American shores and its descendants) has since then
constructed the extra-human as being up for grabs.
This is the geohistorical15 moment of the start of the Western
modern logic of “mastery and possession” of nature—“themaster
words launched by Descartes at the dawn of the scientific and
technological age, when our Western reason went off to conquer
the universe” (Serres, 1998, p. 32). As Dussel (1995) argues,
the ego cogito was historically preceded by the ego conquiro,
the Human who, having arrived outside of Europe, immediately
defined the world of the non-human as existing solely for his
benefit. This was the premise behind the definition of the “New
World”—and, with it, of the totality of the non-human—as terra
nullius, mere nature without humans which could for this motive
be freely appropriated by humanity (Johnston and Lawson, 2005,
pp. 364–365; Mignolo, 1995, p. 260 et passim; Plumwood, 1993,
p. 111, pp. 161–163; Wolfe, 2006). The process by which large
portions of humanity were relegated to categories of Nature-
outside-humanity was simply the necessary condition of this
14See Parenti (2016, pp. 170–171 et passim) for a theoretical framing of Foucault’s
biopolitical logic of government through the milieu in terms that make it possible
to mobilize his thought in the study of the multiple interrelations between
human and extra-human life-elements. Parenti does this by highlighting the
dimension of biopower which deals with the enactment of non-human nature(s)
as a way of enacting specific human arrangements—which, given the necessary
interconnections between human and extra-human implicated in these power-
knowledge exercises, by definition makes them into specific human-and-extra-
human arrangements. He calls this dimension of biopower “geopower”: “if
biopower is about harnessing, channeling, enhancing, and deploying the powers
of bodies at the scale of territorially defined populations, then geopower is
similarly the statecraft and technologies of power that make territory and the
biosphere accessible, legible, knowable, and utilizable” (Parenti, 2016, p. 171). The
extension of Foucault’s work to issues of human-and-extra-human enactments of
collective life is being carried out by the environmentality (i.e., the environmental
governmentality) school of thought. A brief exposition of environmentality’s
general stance can be found in Malette (2011).
15According to Moore, the multiple interconnections between human and extra-
human life-elements through whichmaterial-symbolical worlds are enacted makes
geology a fundamentally historical phenomenon. As he puts it, “the co-produced
character of resource production, unfolding through the human/extra-human
nexus,” which he names “the oikeios,” turns geology into “geohistory”: “Geology,
in other words, becomes geohistory through definite relations of power and
production; these definite relations are geographical, which is to say they are not
relations between humans alone” (Moore, 2016b, p. 95).
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operation of humanity’s mastery and possession of the world
of the non-human. So, a double disqualification is at work in
Western modern paradigm’s conception of Society/Nature: on
the one hand, to the Human belongs the world, subordinating
nature to humanity; on the other hand, the Human is reduced to
the part of humanity which in fact masters and possesses nature,
de facto and/or de jure de-humanizing most human beings (in
various ways), thus disqualifying them as they are placed in the
concomitantly disqualified space (and time16) of nature (Dussel,
1995; Moore, 2016b, pp. 78–79 et passim).
This is the paradigm in which environmental sociology moves
itself. What it sees and how it sees it are strongly conditioned by
the manner in which nature is transformed into the environment
of humanity. As environment, nature is enacted as the mere
surroundings of the Human, the latter existing at the center of
an undeniably anthropocentric cosmos. Since this is a Western
modern cosmos, Anthropos is clearly defined. He is ego cogito
but that is not all that he is. Anthropos at the center of
the universe, Anthropos for whom the universe exists, is also
a capitalist being—perhaps this is what he primarily is, as
the world-ecology school of thought argues by defending the
“Capitalocene” as the most precise concept to encapsulate the
current geohistorical era (Moore, 2016a,b). As such, within the
Western modern paradigm, nature is enacted as the environment
of homo oeconomicus.
As the environment of modern homines oeconomicae,
nature—or, to be more precise, all supposedly non-human
elements of the anthropocentric world—are made into resources
to be conquered, dominated, and appropriated (Serres, 1998;
Moore, 2016b). The reification of the extra-human as Nature is
the first step of a process by which all discrete units of this Nature
are enacted as potential resources to be used and depleted with
all the might and the right the Human confers upon himself
at the expense of all other beings and things. The environment
of humanity is humanity’s reservoir of potential resources. In
this manner, nature-as-environment loses any meaning in itself
and all of its potential significance derives from the use Western
modern capitalist humanity gives it. Its lack of meaning outside
of Western modern capitalist standards makes reified nature
into an entity whose discrete units, both those that are known
and those that might be known, are made into things-as-
potential-commodities. It is not the case of the non-human
being immediately enacted as commodity. Rather, it is enacted
as something that, in itself, is nothing besides a collection of
smaller things, each one of them potentially commodifiable17. In
other words, nature-as-environment has nomeaning besides that
which Western modern capitalism is able of giving it and each
16One of the upmost indicators of this disqualification is the representation of
humans as existing at the head of the arrow of time, always moving forward
through multidimensional-albeit-linear progress, whereas non-humans, in the
state of nature, are immobilized—or at the very least very much slowed down—
in a time of very little value by Western modern standards. See Fabian (2014) for a
framing of this logic in terms of what he calls the “denial of coevalness.”
17This applies to human beings reified as part of Nature as well as to extra-
human life-elements, i.e., to unpaid domestic labor developed in the oikos for the
reproduction of human biological life as it turned into wage-labor as well as to fossil
fuel reserves as they turned into one modern capitalism’s main energy sources.
of its components, and this societal model is only able to give
meaning to commodities (or, to put it more precisely, it is only
capable of ascribing meaning to something by commodifying
it). At any given time, the environment has some discreet units
that are not commodified, as well as others that are. According
to the space-time specific necessities of capitalist modernity, the
life-elements that are categorized as any form of Nature are
brought from the field of potential commodity to that of actual
commodity (and vice versa), thus expanding the total field of
capitalist commodification of the non-human world18.
This modus operandi of commodification by grabbing parts
of the environment and re-signifying (i.e., re-enacting) them
as things with mercantile value transforms these life-elements
into “fictitious commodities.” For Polanyi (2001, pp. 71–80 et
passim), a process of commodification has a “fictitious” character
when it ascribes market value to things that were not produced
with the explicit intention of being sold as merchandise. Thus,
the commodification of such things de-signifies them insofar as
the market is fundamentally incapable of exhausting their total
meaning. In other words, they are far more than something
with market value and to transform them into commodities is
to reduce all of their cultural meaning to market criteria, which
makes them into elements of the world whose total significance
capitalism in not able to grasp, even though it is very much
capable of using and abusing them. Polanyi’s foremost examples
of such “fictitious commodities” are money, labor, and land—
the last of which he describes as “the natural surroundings in
which [society] exists,” making “land [into] only another name
for nature” (Polanyi, 2001, p. 75).
Polanyi’s discussion of “fictitious commodities” is framed
in epistemological and ontological terms that are conflictual
with the position we espouse in this essay. He is clearly
conceptualizing commodification through the lenses of
Society/Nature, reifying land-as-environment, as well as
essentializing the remaining “fictitious commodities,” as is
apparent when he writes that “labor, land, and money are
obviously not commodities: the postulate that anything
that is bought and sold must have been produced for sale
is emphatically untrue in regard to them. In other words,
according to the empirical definition of a commodity they
are not commodities. (. . . ) None of them is produced for
sale. The commodity description of labor, land, and money
is entirely fictitious” (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 75–76). In this sense,
when he writes that “land is only another name for nature”, he
immediately adds that this nature “is not produced by man”
(Polanyi, 2001, p. 75).
Following Moore (2016b)—and taking a cue from a
staple position in STS and ANT—, we can argue that, in
Western capitalist modernity, everything that is commodified is
“originally” produced as a commodity (by being grabbed from
the resource reservoir that is the environment and enacted as
18See Moore (2016b) for a discussion of how capitalism functions by making a
zone of exploitation of paid work-energy dependent on a zone of appropriation
of non-paid human and extra-human work-energy. Life-elements are never placed
in one of these zones once and for all but rather are moved from one to the other
according to capitalism’s space-time specific needs and capabilities.
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a commodity). The point is that there is no such thing as
Nature out-there with an original essence that puts it outside
the collective action of human-and-extra-human arrangements
by which space-time specific ontologies and worlds are enacted—
some of them as commodities. The process of “originally”
producing something as a commodity is precisely this enactment.
Nonetheless, Polanyi’s insight is valuable in two ways. On
the one hand, it makes clear that commodification is inherently
incapable of exhausting the potential meanings—the potential
life—of the elements of the world(s) which are commodified (i.e.,
other enactments of these life-elements are possible and none has
the totalizing capacity of exhausting all that any of them might
be made to be). On the other hand, Polanyi’s argument highlights
that the peculiar market-based enactment of some life-elements
as commodities is inherently damaging, both to them and to the
world(s) to which they belong to (i.e., which they, together with
other life-elements, compose).
In this derivatively polanyian sense, the process of turning
non-human elements of the world(s) into a series of “fictitious
commodities”—i.e., into resources for human production and
consumption, into things that exist solely to guarantee the life
of the Human19—is at the very core of Western modernity. This
societal model exists because the extra-human is turned (reified)
intoNature, which in turn is transformed into the environment of
theHuman and dealt with (i.e., enacted) as a reservoir of potential
commodities. It is this particular kind of commodification that
enables the typically Western modern capitalist human modes
of action and existence that do not reflexively take into account
the manner in which different networks of human and extra-
human life-elements act together to enact certain types of worldly
arrangements (i.e., certain types of worlds). In other words, this
sequential process starts with the reification of the non-human,
follows to its conversion into the Great Outside, there solely
for the use of the Human, then fragments this environment
into discreet units, and lastly picks and chooses which units will
be commodified in a given space and time. It is this process
that enables the kinds of careless human action and existence
that disregard the wellbeing of the extra-human, in extremis
disregarding the very condition of possibility of its existence.
Given that the different life-elements of the world(s) do not
adjust themselves willingly to Western modern fragmentation
of reality—or, to be more precise, Western modern’s enactment
of fragmented realities—, the forms of human action and
existence that are made possible by the sequential process of
reification of the extra-human are both genocidal and suicidal.
The practical symbiosis of human and extra-human life-elements
of space-time specific networks, symbolically denied in Western
modernity, implies that the uncaring disregard that leads to
the extermination of the extra-human also describes a suicidal
operation by which the Human disregards its own conditions of
possibility, its own conditions of a future, of any future20.
19The life of the Human should be understood as a specific manner of living
symbolically valued in Western modernity.
20SeeMcBrien (2016) for a discussion of capitalism as a world-ecology inextricably
linked to extinction, which the author frames in terms of the necrotic properties
of capitalism. According to him, “capitalism was born from extinction, and
from capital, extinction has flowed” (McBrien, 2016, p. 116). Capitalism is
If this is the “environment” in “environmental sociology,”
then, this field of inquiry has a problem. Not one it can
discard or correct but something more profound, which marks
its very core, making “environmental sociology” inextricably
linked to this enactment of the environment. As such, the only
way of successfully facing this problem is to unthink the core
concept of the environment. But given the intimate connection
of this concept to the field of sociology that studies it, to
unthink the environment is to leave environmental sociology
behind in direction to a conception and a practice of sociology
that has discarded the Society/Nature divide and taken as its
focus the myriad interrelations between different life-elements
of the world(s) by which contingent, precarious, and dynamic
“multispecies muddles” (Haraway, 2016, p. 34 et passim) are
enacted. This would be a sociology which, while being attentive
of human peculiarities, would not presume humanity to be the
only peculiar entity in the cosmos and would rather assume that
giving due attention to the interconnectedness of human and
extra-human life-elements of specific space-times is fundamental
to the adequate understanding of the phenomena it deals with. In
other words, in order to make environmental sociology relevant
at a politically and intellectually fundamental level, it must be
unmade and reforged into something very different from what
it was and still predominantly is.
If the environment is part of what must be unthought, a
field of inquiry that takes it to be its core concept—or at least
one of its core concepts—cannot frame the right questions for
the right issues, thus making it unable of providing hypotheses
and coordinates for action which might be used to face the
problems at hand. It is unable of providing these hypotheses and
coordinates because it is not looking at the phenomena that need
to be looked at. The prime example of this is perhaps the focus
on environmental problems, many times conceptualized as an
(the?) environmental crisis. There can only be an environmental
crisis if the extra-human is reduced to the Great Outside
of the Human. Only in this paradigm does human action
damage what is fundamentally other-than-human, creating a
sustainability problem.
Within this paradigm, many are the solutions proposed to
this unsustainability of the life of the Human. These tend
to be framed in the general terms of greening capitalism,
of making sure that Western modern capitalism survives
not only a productive system; its productive process is inherently based on
destruction and death. If capitalism is a necrotic socioecological system, then, it
is simultaneously genocidal and suicidal. Capital accumulation is only possible
through the conversion of life into death—into resources to be depleted or into
things to be annihilated because they stand in the way of these resources. In this
manner, “extinction is both the immediate success and ultimate failure of the real
subsumption of the earth by capital; the ecology of capital is constructed through
attempted erasure of existing ecologies—ecologies that include humans” (McBrien,
2016, p. 117). This logic highlights the inseparable link of genocide and suicide in
capital’s necrosis insofar as it leads to a increasing production of negative value:
if capital needs nature to appropriate and extinguish in order to generate value,
then, the very process of capital accumulation decreases the part of nature that is
available to be thusly appropriated, symmetrically increasing forms of nature that
are hostile to this accumulation and cannot be incorporated into or avoided by this
modus operandi in the longue durée (e.g., toxic waste, garbage, greenhouse gases).
See alsoMoore (2016b) on the extinction of CheapNature by capital accumulation.
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by trying to reduce the rate of world(s)-destruction, thusly
guaranteeing the eternal reproduction both of this societal
model and of its inherent destruction of worlds, including
itself. The main approach to this is technocratic (Crist, 2016;
Hartley, 2016), appearing in the form of proposals to reforest
critical areas of the planet; of geoengineering projects (Altvater,
2016); of attempts to reduce greenhouse gases emissions by
replacing fossil fuels with renewable energies or through
regulated market trade of carbon credits (Vossole, 2013);
and so forth. At best, these are all short-term palliatives
aiming to minimize—but not to fundamentally combat—
climate change and other “environmental” problems. All of
these solutions are doomed to fail simply because what
is problematic is Western modern capitalism itself—within
which both the damages and the solutions are being enacted
(Serres, 1998; Moore, 2016b)21.
Environmental sociology is, at most, a very minor player in
this game of climate/environmental-palliative prescription22. But
it does share with this technocratic approach the same core
concepts of the environment and the environmental crisis, thus
reflecting many of the same shortcomings that are apparent
in policy-making, engineering, economics, the natural sciences,
and other technocratic fields. So maybe it is time to leave
environmental sociology behind. In the face of contemporary
threats to planetary life, it is increasingly urgent to move on
to the radical relationism of space-time specific multiple and
heterogeneous arrangements of different life-elements of the
world(s), both human and extra-human. If we start making this
movement, the environmental crisis is shown as fundamentally
inadequate as a problemwith which we should concern ourselves.
It is shown to be a life-and-death-enactment fraught with
the same symbolical and material problems that have marked
Western modernity since its beginning—the very same problems
that have brought about a state of affairs in which very real
dangers are upon us. Since the environment is a severely
limited, blind, and extinction-prone way of enacting the extra-
human, the environmental crisis is the wrong framing for
these dangers.
21We do not intend to reduce all proposals to deal with the environmental crisis
to their technocratic variations. There are other types of proposals, namely those
emerging from the heterogeneous schools of environmentalism. Their discussion
is beyond this essay. Nevertheless, it can be argued that most of them operate
in the same epistemological and ontological framework of scientific and policy-
related technocracy, and thus share the many of the same problems. Sometimes
the solutions they propose are dependent on the same technologies as scientific
and policy-related technocracy. But even when they are framed around notions of
“going back to nature,” of living in harmony with a Nature that exist out-there,
undisturbed by human action, these solutions are firmly rooted in Society/Nature.
While seeking to denounce Nature’s degradation by Society, both entities are reified
and solidly placed in relation to each other—and a relation in which humanity is
the only true actor to be found among the multiple life-elements of the cosmos.
The will to leave the environment undisturbed does so in more ways than one,
making it impossible to leave the environment behind and move on to space-time
specific enactments of worlds through the myriad interrelations of life-elements.
22In general, all environmental social sciences are minor players in this game, with
the exceptions of (behavioral) psychology and (neoclassic) economics, which have
a relevant role in environmental policy making (Shove, 2010). Nonetheless, even
economics and psychology have not shifted the dominance of the natural sciences
in this field.
None of this means that all is well; far from it. Although we
distance ourselves from certain discourses about the current
and/or inevitably coming planetary (i.e., “environmental”)
catastrophe23, here, we stand with Latour (2011): one
should give due attention to the Apocalypse brought about
through poorly enacted realities of human and extra-human
entanglement; it is not because the End has been repeatedly
announced throughout history and never came that one
should blind him or herself to the fact that profound and
rapid changes to the biosphere are verifiable and very likely
to increase in the near future, making the Apocalypse a
significant material possibility—at least for humanity, but
we can be sure that if we go down we will be taking others
with us.
There is a vital crisis—literally a crisis of vitality, a crisis of
life enactments—but this is a crisis of world(s)-building. It is a
crisis of Western modernity and of the types of life-realities that
are possible (and impossible) to enact within its boundaries. It
is a crisis of a societal model that, as Marx (1975) reminded us,
is based on the alienation of humanity from nature, making the
latter into a mere means of guaranteeing human life—which is
inextricable from the alienation of each human being from what
he or she produces, from his or her own self, and from other
human beings24. This changes the problems we—both human
and extra-human—have to face, making it inevitable to conclude
that only through revolutionary change25 of theWestern modern
capitalist societal model could the world(s)-building crisis be
unmade—even if its consequences will very likely shape the
conditions of possibility for most, if not all, future enactments
of human-with-extra-human arrangements of life.
(DEFINITIVELY NOT) CONCLUSIONS:
UNTHINKING FROM THE MARGINS
How can we leave the world(s)-building crisis behind? How
can Western modern problematic enactments of the web of
life be successfully unmade and remade in ways that do not
oppress the world(s)’ life-elements, both human and extra-
human? Unthinking the epistemic foundations of both Western
23See McBrien (2016) and Haraway (2016) for a critical discussion of
“catastrophism” and of howmainstream narratives on the Anthropocene reinforce
this worldview.
24See also Moore (2016a, p. 86 et passim).
25Having just quoted Marx, the meaning of revolution could be misconstrued
by some readers. We are not a priori framing it in any way, neither in terms of
process nor in terms of teleology. By definition, the fundamental transformation
of a societal model is revolutionary. And, also by definition, fundamental
transformations are violent—sometimes physically, but always epistemologically
and ontologically, and thus materially. But the specific character of such violent
actions can only be defined by the actors who collectively develop the multiple
space-time localized practices by which such transformations are brought about.
Taking an example from decolonial historical processes, the “non-violent” Gandhi-
model (Gandhi, 2006) of revolution is not necessarily less violent than the
Fanon-model (Fanon, 2001, 2008), although they are carried out by very
different sets of actors-elements and practices. The inherent violence of these
processes is profoundly variable both in scope and in kind, and only during
their development can it be decided and classified in any way. Analytically and
politically, physical intra- and inter-species overt aggression is only one of the
many forms revolutionary violence can assume.
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modernity and of its predominant forms of knowledge, including
the social sciences, is the first step for the much-needed
reenactment of life. One of the things that this process leads to
is to the reforging of environmental sociology into something
quite different from what it has been. It leads to dropping
the environment from a sociology that concerns itself with the
multiple, heterogeneous, space-time specific relations of life-
elements by which humanity and nature are contingently made
and remade.
But how can this be achieved? Any answer to this question
is fraught with the pitfalls of hubris. Aiming to provide definite
answers to similar questions is a very Western modern stance. It
is, without a doubt, possible to attempt to do so—but only at the
risk of replicating the very paradigm that created the problems
discussed in this essay, as well as many others. We do not have
any such proposal to close what has been said. We cannot have
it because what has been said is entirely open-ended. And since
life is always locally enacted in particular places and times, by
particular networks of human and extra-human elements, the
problems of life can only be—precariously—dealt with by each of
the multitudes that are implicated in its enactments. Answers for
problems related to the enactments of life can—and quite likely
need to—be inter-locally coordinated, but no one locality or actor
is able of providing them for the others. All that we dare to put
forward are tentative sensibilities and intuitions.
By their inter-local contingent and conflictual
coordination(s), the multiple processes of life-reenactment
that are needed in order to overcome life-and-death issues such
as changes to the biosphere, deforestation, or the extinction of
entire species, are inherently revolutionary. And revolutions are
arduous things to make—especially when, like what is at stake
in these cases of life-enactments, they cannot be made once and
for all.
One cannot leave Western modernity by establishing
something else in an instant. It is not possible to enact what
one cannot imagine and our—individual as well as collective—
imaginations are severely—albeit not completely—limited by
Western modern habits of thought and practice. Given this,
any revolution of Western modern forms of enacting life can
only be done from within Western modernity itself. Fortunately,
Western modernity is not homogeneous. It is a succession of life-
enactments that have manifold forms, although they share some
fundamental (i.e., paradigmatic) assumptions.
As Law and Lien (2012a) remind us, Western modernity
enacts the Society/Culture divide both coherently and non-
coherently. This societal model has an undeniable will-to-
singularity. It attempts to construct singular ontologies of both
Society and Nature that are valid everywhere. But, at the same
time and with the same relative importance, even withinWestern
modernity there are multiple enactments of society and nature.
Each specific space-time makes and remakes their own version of
both. This does not annul the will-to-singularity but rather makes
unicity inherently dependent on multiplicity.
This is a relevant opening. It allows for revolution fromwithin.
It allows for the exploration of the multiplicity, contingency,
and ambivalence that are intrinsic to Western modernity as a
possible way of reframing what this societal model has tried to
solidify. In this manner, it might be possible to shake things up
just enough to turn solids into fluids, to agitate life-elements
just enough to make it possible for them to connect with
each other in different, non-oppressive and non-extinction-
prone forms. Unthinking what and how we know about the
elements of life is one of the fundamental processes by which
Western modernity can be productively and revolutionarily
shaken through its non-coherences.
It is much more likely that this can be done not from
the center(s) of Western modernity but from its margins. By
definition, these margins are not outside of this societal model
and of its predominant ways of knowing. But these are the places
where Western modernity, through its non-coherences, comes
into direct contact with the possibility of something other than
itself. It is from here that a transformative exercise of “border
thinking” (Mignolo, 2000)—or, rather, border unthinking—can
be carried out. These margins are the places where ontologies
and realities are not-quite-made, where they are almost-enacted,
where they start to be performed by local networks of life-
elements but are then interrupted and discarded26. But even
though they are not fully made, they make a statement about
the potentiality of other ways of enacting the web of life. And
even when these other forms of enacting ontologies of and
relations between “nature,” “humanity,” and other categories, are
dropped due to their impracticality or their high costs, their
potentiality remains.
A sociology that deals with the multiple enactments of the
web of life—and definitively not one that is “environmental”—
can contribute to this border unthinking. It can do so by looking
at how the world(s) can be, not in a metaphysical sense, but by
exploring empirically partially enacted potentialities. It can do so
by looking for those ontologies of nature, humanity, and so forth,
that, although not completely enacted, are perceived and whose
making is started by local actors only to then be interrupted
and discarded for a myriad of reasons. It is from what can be
(made to be) that it might be possible to productively fracture
Western modernity’s crisis of world(s)-building in direction to
a multiplicity of space-time localized socioecological enactments
that do not subjugate life, whether it is contingently distributed
and performed as human or as extra-human.
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